I. INTRODUCTION The secret sharing communication system (SSCS) is an extension of both Shannon's cipher system [l] and the secret sharing system [2] . In previous papers, the author has proved coding theorems for the SSCS with two or three noiseless channels [3] or with two discrete memoryless broadcast channels [4] . In this correspondence, a coding theorem is proved for the SSCS with two Gaussian wiretap channels (GWC's) that is shown in Fig. 1 . The information SK must be transmitted to the legitimate Manuscript received September 18,1989; revised September 11, 1990 . This work was presented in part at the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, San Diego, CA, January [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 1990 .
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receiver with arbitrarily small error probability via two Gaussian channels. Since the information may be wiretapped by unauthorized persons through each GWC, we must devise the encoding such that the information can be kept as secret from them as possible. The coding problem for the SSCS is to determine the admissible region of rates and security levels.
The following three cases are considered.
1) Two wiretappers cannot cooperate with each other. 2) They can cooperate to decipher the information SK.
3) It is not known whether they can cooperate or not.
In Case 1) which is the case treated in [4] , the security level of each channel can be measured by the equivocation of each wiretapper, (l/K>H(SKIZ,vj).
Case 2) is equivalent to the system with one GWC since the security level of the system can be measured by (l/K)H(SKIZ~Z~).
However, it is more complicated than the ordinary GWC treated in [5] because the two channels can be used at different rates. In Case 3), we should consider both &Z (SKIZF) and ~H(SKIZ~Z~)
as security levels of the system. The Gaussian wiretap channel [5] is classified as a special case of the additive white Gaussian noise broadcast channel (AWGN-BC), i.e., a physically degraded BC (see [6] ). Hence we can treat the SSCS with two AWGN-BC's instead of two GWC's. However, it is known that every AWGN-BC can be viewed as a degraded BC shown in Fig. 2 . Furthermore, if the system does not have a feedback channel, then the degraded BC is equivalent to a physically degraded BC. Let a$,,~$ and u&(T;~,(T~, be the variances of Wj,k$ of the GWC shown in Fig. 1 and W, V,, V, of Fig. 2 , respectively. If LT;~ is less than m;,, then the degraded BC is equivalent to the GWC with uij = ui + a$ and u2 = u;~-u;~. Otherwise, we can treat the degraded BC as v, the GWC with CT;, = a& + u; and a;. = 0 in our case. Therefore, for simplicity: we treat (he SSCS'with two GWC's rather than two AWGN-BC's.
The problem and the coding theorem are formally stated in Section II, and the theorem is proved in Section III. Some remarks are collected in Section IV.
II. CODING THEOREM FOR SSCS WITH Two GWC's
We consider the communication system shown in Fig. 1 . The source emits a sequence (S&=, of independent copies of a random variable (RV) S taking values in a finite set 9. Each GWC j (j = 1,2) has one input Xi and two outputs 5 and Zj, which are related to each other by q= xj + wj
zj=~+l$ (4
Here II$ and I$ are independent, identically distributed Gaussian RV's with zero-mean and variance a& and a$, respectively. Furthermore, WI, W,, VI, V, are mutually independent, and they are also independent of both X, and X2. We assume that the average power of each channel is limited to Pi 
Furthermore, the secrecy capacity C,, of each GWC [5] is given by A code (f, 4) for the SSCS with two GWC's is defined by two mappings.
where 9 is the field of real numbers. We write f: 9KX9-+2.P~XsP~,
iK=4(Y&Y$y,
where T is some random variable taking values in a finite set 97
The encoder f can use T, besides SK, to randomize the codewords Xp and Xp. Since Y and T. can be chosen arbitrarily, the encoder f can be restricted to deterministic functions without loss of generality. The rate of channel j is defined as h$/K. The security level of SK for wiretapper j is measured by (l/KIH(SK IZ,T), while it is measured by (1/K>H(SKlZ~Z2",> if wiretappers 1 and 2 can cooperate with each other.
We treat three cases mentioned in Section I. The security in each case is evaluated by the following.
1) (l/K)H(SKIZ~)
and (l/K)H(SKIZ?),
We mainly consider Case 3); Cases 1) and 2) can be treated as a special case of Case 3).
Definition 1: (R,, R,, h,, h,, h,,) is admissible for the SSCS The secrecy capacity region 5%': is the rate region such that the information SK can be kept entirely secret from two wiretappers. These regions are explicitly determined by the following with two GWC's if there exist a random variable T and a code theorem and corollaries. It implies only that each equivocation is bounded below by h,, h,, h,,, respectively. For instance, (h,, h,, h,,) may be admissible but will be unachievable if min(h,, h,) < h,, because of
Definition 2: The admissible region 9, for Case I, (I = 1,2,3) is defined as
S,~{(R,,RZ,h12):
Definition 3: The secrecy capacity region 9: for Case 1, (1= 1,2,3) is defined as 9~~{(R,,R,):(R1,R,,H(S),H(S),0) isadmissible}, ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 37, NO. 3, MAY 1991 Theorem 1: Suppose 0 I h,, h,, h,, 5 H(S). Then 
Corollary 5 The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section III, while the corollaries can be easily derived from Theorem 1.
We note that Corollaries 1 and 3 are the direct analogue of the coding theorem for the SSCS with two discrete memoryless broadcast channels which was proved in Assume that a code (f, 4) and a random variable T satisfy (lo)- (13), and the probability distribution of RV'S Xj,q,Zj is determined by (9) 
where E,,, Al) + 0 as E -+ 0, and equalities and inequality =I, 22, =3, =4, r5 can be derived from On the other hand, data processing inequality asserts that Z(ST;Y,) I Z(X,;Y,).
(30) From (29) and (30), we obtain Kh, I Z(x,; Yl) + Z( X2; Y21Z2) + KE().
The coding theorem for the ordinary AWGN channel yields the inequality z(xj;q) Iiy&fj.
Furthermore, (76) in [5] proves that Z( Xi; ?lZ,) I NjCsj.
Hence, substituting (32) and (33) into (31) and using (lo), we get = (R, + E)&, + (R, + c)Cs2 + ~6.
Similarly we can obtain h, I (R, + e)Cs, + (R, + E)C,~ + ~6. Combining (lo), (12), (33), and (37), we get h,, I GCs, + ;Cs2 + ~6 I (R, + E)C,, + (R, + l )Cs2 + et).
Furthermore, from (28) and (30) (40) Since (34), (35), (38), and (40) hold for any et) > 0, (R,, R,, h,, h,, h,,) must satisfy (20)-(23).
B. Direct Part
It is well known that K[H(S)+ S] bits suffice to describe the typical sequences of length K. When these bits are transmitted to the decoder, the decoder can recover the information SK with error probability S' such that S, S' + 0 as K + w Hence, we show how to transmit these K[H(S)+ 61 bits via two Gaussian channels to achieve given rates and security levels.
For given (R,, R,, h,, h,, h,,) satisfying (20)- (23), we define the code length Nj by Rj+ (41) By choosing K and Nj sufficiently large, E > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small. Then from (20)-(23), the following inequalities hold for some E' > 0 such that E' + 0 as E + 0:
Kh,, I N,( Cs, -E') + N2( Cs, -E') (44)
Let hi and hi be the constants that satisfy (42) and (43) with equality, respectively. Then h; 2 hi. We divide these K[ H(S)+ 61 bits into five parts al -a5 as shown in Fig. 3 . These parts have the following lengths:
L N~(CM~ e') bits From the equiprobable character of typical sequences, we can treat a, -a5 as mutually independent uniformly distributed binary numbers. Hence, in order to satisfy (ll), a2 -a5 and a, -a4 must be kept secret from wiretappers 1 and 2, respectively, while a, and a5 may leak out to wiretappers 1 and 2, respectively. Let B;I = (a1,a2, a,@T), Bfl = a2, Biz = (T, a4, a,), and Bk2 = a where n. = N.(C -E'), k. = N.(C, -E'), T is an indzpendint uniformly d!lstriMduted biiary r&dom number having the same length as a3, and @ stands for the bitwise modulo two sum. From Lemma A3 in the Appendix, B,!J (j = 1,2) can be encoded by a code of length Nj such that B,!'j can be transmitted to the legitimate receiver via GWC j with arbitrarily small error probability, and B,kj satisfies
where E" + 0 as Nj -+ 00. Therefore the legitimate receiver can reproduce SK from ( B;I, Bg2) with arbitrary small error proability. Furthermore, we have for some y > 4 (y + 0 as K -+ 00) that
H(a,,a2,a31Z,NZ)2N,(C,,-E')--
because a3 is covered with the independent uniformly distributed random number T, and Zp and Zp contains no information about (a,, a,) and (a,, a,), respectively. Hence, from (42), (46) (50) ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 37, NO. 3, MAY 1991 If two wiretappers can cooperate, they can know a1,a3,a5. with E > 0, then there exists a code such that the error rate of But they cannot know either a2 or a4. Hence, their equivocation the legitimate receiver and the equivocation of the wiretapper is bounded by are bounded by and Pr{ B" # I?} I d'
where the last inequality follows from (44).
respectively, where E" + 0 as N + M.
Proofi Lemma A3 can be easily derived from Theorem 2 in t51.
q It follows from (40, (491, (501, and (51) that CR, , R2, h, , h, , 4 H(S) 5 'G~,U'I)RI + %2(P2)R2 P 2 P,R, + P,R,} .
(55)
The admissible regions s[ (1 = 1,2) and the secrecy capacity region 2: (1= 1,2,3) can be described in the same way. 
The proofs are straightforward and are therefore omitted: For the ordinary GWC system, the following lemma holds. Lemma A3: Let B" be a sequence of n outputs from the independent, identically distributed binary source with H(B) = 1, and let Bk be an arbitrarily chosen k-consecutive component of B". In the case that B" is transmitted via a GWC to a legitimate receiver, if the code length N satisfies n= N(C,,,-e) (58) k=N(C,-•)
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